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Abstract: 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 security policies aimed at combating terrorist 
threats have been implemented all around the world. Governments and experts emphasize that this 
‘new terrorism’ requires totally new means of fighting it. As a result new counter-terrorism is 
spreading and seems to be appearing everywhere. But how do we know if any of the policies 
intended to tackle terrorism are really working? How can we measure the effectiveness of these 
measures? Governments and officials point to the number of incidences, arrested and killed terrorists 
or the amounts of terrorist financing that has been confiscated as an indicator, while academia often 
refers to more sophisticated equations involving time series in risk management and cost-benefit 
calculations. Although, these rationalist approaches appear straightforward and seem to provide the 
quantified data required for the measurement of the success of these policies, there seems to be an 
error in the measure of terror! This paper will provide a critique of the existing rationalist methods of 
assessing the effectiveness of counter-terrorism and is predominantly aimed at highlighting their 
weaknesses as well as introducing the need for further research into additional and alternative ways 
of evaluating counter-terrorism. 
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Resumen: 
Tras los atentados terroristas del 11 de septiembre de 2001, se han llevado a cabo en todo el mundo 
políticas para combatir las amenazas terroristas. Los gobiernos y los expertos resaltan que este 
“nuevo terrorismo” requiere medios totalmente nuevos para combatirlo. En consecuencia, el nuevo 
contraterrorismo se está extendiendo y parece estar apareciendo en todas partes. Pero ¿como 
sabemos si estas políticas orientadas a combatir el terrorismo están funcionando realmente? ¿Cómo 
medir la eficacia de estas medidas? Los gobiernos y los funcionarios utilizan como indicador el 
numero de incidentes, de terroristas detenidos o muertos o las cantidades de dinero destinado a la 
financiación de los terroristas que se han confiscado; mientras que los académicos emplean 
frecuentemente ecuaciones mas sofisticadas, con series temporales de gestión de riesgos y cálculos 
coste-beneficio. Aunque estos enfoques racionalistas parecen claros y aparentan proporcionar los 
datos cuantitativos necesarios para medir el éxito de estas políticas, ¡parece haber un error en la 
medida del terror! Este artículo aporta una crítica de los métodos racionalistas existentes para 
evaluar la eficacia del contraterrorismo, y pretende ante todo resaltar sus debilidades así como 
presentar la necesidad de nuevas investigaciones sobre métodos adicionales y alternativos para 
evaluar el contraterrorismo.  
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Introduction 
The question of whether the United States and its allies are winning or losing the war on 
terrorism is being fiercely debated among authors and in the media. Some point to successes 
such as arrested leaders, killed terrorists or the amount of terrorist money that has been frozen 
since September 11 (hereafter 9/11). Others note the failures in the form of continued attacks 
in Bali, Madrid and London as well as the growing weariness of US allies.2 Regardless of 
whether ‘war’ is the correct term for this conflict or whether such a war can be won or not, 
this debate does raise some very important issues: how do we know if any of the policies 
intended to combat terrorism are really any good? Counter-terrorism is as old as terrorism 
itself, as governments have always attempted to tackle the ‘terrorist’ groups which oppose 
them. Counter-terrorism refers to all kinds of policies, operations and programmes that 
governments implement to combat terrorism.3       
We are being told by many of the policy makers and leading terrorism experts that the 
‘new terrorism’ we are facing today requires totally new counter-terrorism measures to deal 
with it effectively. One of the most famous terrorism experts Bruce Hoffman has noted that 
“[n]othing less than a sea-change in our thinking about terrorism and the policies required to 
counter it will be required.”4 Although the ‘newness’ of terrorism today can be questioned,5 
how can we tell a good counter-terrorism measure from a bad one? The aim of this paper is to 
give an insight into the weaknesses of the dominant rationalist approaches of assessing the 
effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies. The research is important because at present 
increasingly restrictive and controversial counter-terrorism measures are being implemented 
without the possibility of evaluating their usefulness and necessity. The anti-terror bill in the 
UK which proposed to imprison suspected terrorists for three months without trial or the 
highly controversial shoot-to-kill policy following the London bombings is a prime example 
of this. As much in a fight against terrorism as against conventional enemies, inadequate 
measures of effectiveness can contribute to complacency, the wrong allocation of scarce 
resources and horrible surprises.6 Unfortunately, for all the significant research that judges 
military effectiveness7, measures of counter-terrorism policies remain shallow. Different to a 
traditional military campaign, there is no enemy capital to take over or industry to destroy. 
The unsatisfactory answer often given highlights the number of attacks and casualties or looks 
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 For a range of very different origins and opinions see for example The Economist (2003) “Tackling a Hydra” 
30 January, or Hirsh, Michael: “9/11 – and Counting; Four Years In, No Clear Plan”, The Washington Post, 
September 11 2005, pp. B01, Scheuer, Michael (2004): Imperial Hubris: Why the West is losing the war in 
terror, Dulles, Brassey’s Inc. or Ullman, Harlan: “Is the US winning or losing the global war on terror and how 
do we know?, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 1 (2006), pp. 29-41.  
3
 For a comprehensive list of different counter-terrorism policies see: United Nations Office for Drugs and 
Crime,  A Classification of Counter-Terrorism Measures, available at: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_ 
measures.html 
4
 Hoffman, Bruce (1998): Inside Terrorism, New York, Columbia University Press, pp. 212. 
5
 See Tucker, David: “What’s New About the New Terrorism and How Dangerous Is It”, Terrorism and 
Political Violence, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2001), pp. 1-14 or Spencer, Alexander: “Questioning the Concept of New 
Terrorism”, Peace Conflict & Development, Vol. 8 (2006), pp. 1-33.   
6
 Byman, Daniel: “Measuring the War on Terrorism: A First Appraisal”, Current History, Vol. 102, No. 668, 
(2003), pp. 411-416.  
7
 See for example Biddle, Stephen & Long, Stephen: “Democracy and Military Effectiveness – A Deeper Look”, 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 4, (2004), pp. 525-546 or Minkwitz, Oliver: “Demokratien und 
militärische Effektivität – Warum sich Demokratien tendenziell besser schlagen”, Zeitschrift für Internationale 
Beziehungen, Vol. 2 (2005), pp. 301-336.   
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at the quantity of arrested or killed terrorists.8 However appealing and easy this measure of 
success is, a ‘body-count’ or ‘number of incident’ approach can be deceptive.9 So what 
standards could be used to assess the success or failure of existing counter-terrorism 
measures? So far "[t]here is almost a complete absence of high quality scientific evaluation 
evidence on counter-terrorism strategies”10 and “[a] concrete methodology for studying a 
state’s ability to cope with wide-scale terrorism remains to be developed.”11  
No academic discipline has the monopoly over ‘terrorism research’. Since the 1960s 
research on the topic has been predominantly conducted in the fields of sociology, psychology 
and political science in general, but considering that we are apparently facing international 
terrorism today, surprisingly little International Relations theory has been explicitly applied to 
the study of terrorism. A brief scan of the two leading specialist journals on terrorism research 
— Terrorism and Political Violence and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism — seems to show 
that no articles are directly concerned about applying IR theory to terrorism and a brief look at 
six leading IR theory journals seems to confirm this trend.12 Nevertheless, international 
terrorism is part of International Relations. It is a subject that plays an important role in 
international politics, international organisations and foreign policy considerations of many 
states around the world. Nearly all governments have implemented some kind of counter-
terrorism policies following 9/11 and many have co-operated internationally to fight ‘global 
terrorism’. The question of how to measure the effectiveness of these counter-terrorism 
policies is important.   
The following paper will provide a critique of the dominant rationalist approaches of 
‘measuring’ counter-terrorism effectiveness. It thereby calls for further research on the subject 
and emphasises the urgent need to reflect on other possible ways of evaluating counter-
terrorism. It hopes to indicate the potential of shifting the focus, considering the fear and 
terror aspect of terrorism, and centring on the feeling of security counter-terrorism policies 
generate.    
In pursuit of these points the rest of the paper will be structured as follows:  section two 
will review some of the rationalist arguments used to highlight successful counter-terrorism 
measures. This will include simple rational indicators used by governments and the media as 
well as some of the academic studies conducted on the subject predominantly in the field of 
risk assessment and cost-benefit calculations which use data on terrorist events and time 
series. This will be followed by section three, which sets forth the difficulties and weaknesses 
of such rationalist approaches. The fourth section will argue that rationalist approaches totally 
neglect the main component of terrorism: fear. The feeling of fear, not the physical 
destruction caused by terrorism, is important and this feeling of fear seems in no “rational” 
proportion to the actual low risk of being personally involved in a terrorist attack. Section five 
calls for further research into potential alternative or supplementary approaches to assessing 
the effectiveness of counter-terrorism. This includes the possible use of social constructivist 
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 Pillar, Paul R. (2001): Terrorism and U. S. Foreign Policy, Washington, Brookings Institution Press, pp. 217-
235. 
9
 Byman, Daniel: “Scoring the War on Terrorism”, The National Interest, (Summer 2003), pp. 75-84.  
10
 Lum, Cynthia, Kennedy, Leslie W. & Sherley, Alison J.: “The Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Strategies”, 
A Campbell Systematic Review, (January 2006), p. ii.   
11
 Morag, Nadav: “Measuring Success in Coping with Terrorism: The Israeli Case”, Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, Vol. 28, No. 4 (2005), p. 308.  
12
 Lynch, Mark: “Understanding al-Qaeda: the irrelevance of IR theory”, (2005), at http://abuaardvark.typepad 
.com/abuaardvark/2005/11/understanding_a.html. 
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approaches and methodologies such as discourse analysis. The final section will summarise 
the main arguments and draw tentative conclusions. 
 
1. Rationalist approaches 
The United States and many of it allies have spend billions on counter-terrorism since the 
attacks of 9/11. Exactly demarcating the policy area of counter-terrorism is difficult, as 
measures implemented in the name of fighting terrorism are very different.13 These include 
policies such as enhanced border and airport security, tightened security at embassies, the 
implementation of new anti-terror laws, the investment in anti-terrorist technology, the 
establishment of crisis management plans, the restructuring of security services and the 
creation of whole new bureaucratic counter-terrorism departments.14 It has been estimated 
that the money spent in the U.S. on increased security measures in response to 9/11 by both 
the public and private sector will amount to roughly $72 billion per year.15 Official 
government figures point out that, between the fiscal years 2002 and 2005, U.S. funding for 
homeland security increased by 39 percent from $33 billion in 2002 to $46 billion in 2005. 
For the fiscal year 2006, President George Bush has requested nearly $50 billion for activities 
associated with homeland security excluding direct military action.16 Democratic 
governments around the world are generally required to justify their spending to their citizens. 
As with many other policies, bureaucracies and government agencies are held accountable for 
the cost-effectiveness of their expenditure. For example, in the U.S. the Government 
Performance Results Act of 1993 calls for agencies to provide “assessment of the results of a 
program activity compared to its intended purpose” in a quantitative or qualitative manner. In 
other words they have to give evidence of their performance and measure their progress 
against their aims.17 Similar laws exist in most other democratic states and in response 
governments and the respective agencies involved in combating terrorism try to provide 
evidence of their measurable and effective progress.  
Traditionally, governments and their agencies have often used simple rational indicators 
to highlight ‘success’ in the ‘war on terrorism’, such as the number of attacks and casualties, 
arrested leaders, killed terrorists or the amount of terrorist money which has been frozen since 
9/11. The US government has repeatedly highlighted that it has killed or captured two-thirds 
of the Al-Qaeda’s top leadership and has frozen over $200 million of terrorist financing.18 By 
September 2004 it had charged 350 individuals with terrorism related charges and convicted 
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 For more information on the counter-terrorism measures implemented by different governments see: Buckley, 
Mary and Fawn, Rick (eds.) (2003): Global Responses to Terrorism – 9/11, Afghanistan and Beyond, London, 
Routledge; Von Hippel, Karin (ed.) (2005): Europe Confronts Terrorism, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan; 
Alexander, Yonah (ed.) (2002): Combating Terrorism – Strategies of Ten Countries, Ann Arbor, University of 
Michigan Press.  
14
 Steven, Graeme C. S. and Gunaratna, Rohan (2004): Counterterrorism – A Reference Handbook, 
Contemporary World Issues, Santa Barbara, ABC Clio, pp. 99-134. 
15
 Hobijn, Bart: “What Will Homeland Security Cost?”, Economic Policy Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2002), pp. 21-
33. 
16
 Government Accountability Office: Combating Terrorism – Determining and Reporting Federal Funding 
Data, Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO-06-161, (2006), pp. 1-2, at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov 
/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=d06161.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/ data/gao 
17
 The Government Performance Results Act of 1993, Office of Management and Budget, at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/mgmt-gpra/gplaw2m.html. 
18
 Progress Report in the Global War on Terrorism, Washington: The White House, at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/progress. 
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over 185 people. It has disrupted alleged terrorist cells in New York, Washington, Oregon, 
North Virginia, North Carolina, and Florida. Furthermore, its military campaigns and the 
toppling of the regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq are presented as measures of success in the 
war on terrorism.19 At the same time it is possible to point to terrorist attacks, which were 
aborted or intercepted due to the counter-terrorism work of governments, as a measurement of 
counter-terrorist effectiveness. These have included the botched bombing of a US airline by 
the Shoe Bomber Richard Reid in December 2001, the foiling of an attempted truck bomb 
attack in Singapore aimed at embassies, the airport and financial district, or the failed effort to 
bomb of U.S. embassies in Rome and Paris.20 George Bush in October 2005 declared that the 
US and its allies had stopped ten major attacks since 9/11, including attacks with hijacked 
aeroplanes in 2002 and 200321, and in the UK the mayor of London Ken Livingston reported 
that since 9/11 government authorities have foiled ten terrorist attacks on London alone.22    
Parallel to government attempts to highlight the effectiveness of their counter-terrorism 
measures, there are a limited number of academic studies which have dealt directly with the 
topic of measuring effectiveness. Some point out that the numbers of fatalities generally gives 
a good impression of the success of terrorist activities and are therefore a good way of 
assessing the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures.23 Other scholars such as Jonathan 
Stevenson believe that the effectiveness of counter-terrorist measures and the victory in the 
war on terrorism “is likely to reveal itself over time as a negative – the relative absence of 
terrorism – gradually confirmed by an increase in arrests and convictions and by more 
probative intelligence.”24 
A study by Cynthia Lum, Leslie W. Kennedy and Alison J. Sherley highlights the 
apparent gap in the literature, noting that only about 3000 (or 1,5 percent) of a total of 20,000 
studies on the topic of terrorism discuss the idea of evaluating the effectiveness of counter-
terrorist measures in some form, while only seven deal with it specifically.25  Those who have 
attempted to assess the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures have done so 
predominantly by using time-series and intervention analysis. They believe that a successful 
counter-terrorism measure reduces the amount of terrorist violence and therefore that, if the 
level of terrorist incidents is plotted over time and against some policy indicators, it is 
possible to see whether the measure is effective or not.26 The central argument in other words, 
is that certain effective counter-terrorist policies will produce a change in the terrorist’s 
modus operandi, which will be visible in the pattern of incidences. Here it is assumed that 
terrorists groups act in a western rational way, that they reflect and substitute certain types of 
action with others when faced with excessive difficulties. They believe terrorists to be rational 
actors and place great emphasis on them being a ‘homos economicus’. Terrorists have a 
certain limited budget and try to maximise the effect of their resources. Measures taken to 
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 See Three Years of Progress in the War on Terrorism, Fact Sheet, The White House, Office of the Press 
Secretary, Washington DC, 11 September 2004, at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2004/36156.htm.   
20
 Rogers, Paul: “The War on Terrorism: Winning or Losing”, Briefing Paper (September 2003), Oxford, Oxford 
Research Group.  
21
 Sanger, David E.: “The Struggle for Iraq: President’s Address; 10 Plots Foiled Since Sept. 11, Bush Declares”, 
The New York Times, 7 October 2005.  
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 Milne, Jonathan: “Ten attempted terror attacks in London since 9/11 says mayor”, The Guardian, 27 
December 2005. 
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 Morag, op. cit., p. 310.  
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 Stevenson, Jonathan: “Counter-terrorism: Containment and Beyond”, Adelphi Paper, No. 367 (2004), p. 92.  
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 Lum et al., op. cit.   
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raise the cost of certain types of terrorist activities lead them use other types of tactics whose 
cost has not risen. 
One of the first studies to use economics in the analysis of counter-terrorist measures was 
by William M. Landes, who in 1978 used ordinary least squares regression techniques to 
examine the aircraft hijackings in the US during 1961-1976. He showed with econometric 
methods that the use of sky marshals and metal detectors had had a significant positive effect 
on the probability of apprehension and a significant negative influence on the number of 
offences committed. The data indicated a steep drop in skyjackings after these security 
measures became operational in January 1973. In the US, there were twenty-seven incidents 
of skyjackings in 1972 and only one in 1973.27 Other studies which have also used economic 
calculations to measure effectiveness include Jon Cauley and Eric Im’s use of intervention or 
interrupted time series analysis to evaluate the impact of metal detectors, fortified embassies 
and the UN convention on preventing attacks on protected persons;28 Walter Enders, Todd 
Sandler and Jon Cauley’s examination of UN conventions and international responses to 
hijackings using a refined application of intervention analysis;29 and Bryan Brophy-Baermann 
and John Conybeare’s paper on short and long term effects of Israeli retaliation attacks.30 
Other studies include the evaluation of U.S. air raids on Libya and their effectiveness against 
terrorism by Henry Prunckun and Philip Mohr,31 and the intervention analysis of Basque 
terrorism in Spain by Carlos Pestana Barros, which evaluates the effectiveness of policies 
against ETA using time series data from 1968 to 2000.32 More recently, Asaf and Noam 
Zussman have evaluated the effectiveness of a counter-terrorism policy by examining Israeli 
targeted assassinations of terrorists and the reaction of this on the Israeli stock market33 and 
Benjamin Zycher examines counter-terrorism policies in a benefit/cost framework on the 
basis of moderate, severe and nuclear terrorist attack scenarios in the United States.34  
One of the most famous rationalist econometric assessments of effectiveness of counter-
terrorism measures, however, is Walter Enders and Todd Sandler’s vector-autoregession-
intervention analysis.35 Enders and Sandler examined a number of counter-terrorism 
measures, including retaliatory raids, fortification of embassies, metal detectors and anti-
terrorism laws. Their idea is that terrorists act according to a consumer-choice model, where 
they “maximize utility or expected utility obtained from the consumption of basic 
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 Landes, William M.: “An Economic Study of US Aircraft Hijackings, 1961-1976”, Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol. 21 (April 1978), pp. 1-31.  
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 Cauley, Jon and Im, Eric I.: “Intervention Policy Analysis of Skyjackings and Other Terrorist Incidences”, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 2 (1988), pp. 27-31.  
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 Enders, Walter; Sandler, Todd and Cauley, Jon: “UN Conventions, Technology and Retaliation in the Fight 
Against Terrorism: An Econometric Evaluation”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1990), pp. 83-
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 Brophy-Baermann, Bryan and Conybeare, John A. C.: “Retaliating Against Terrorism: Rational Expectations 
and the Optimality of Rules versus Discretion”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 1 (1994), 
pp. 196-210.  
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 Prunckun, Henry W. Jr. and Mohr, Philip B.: “Military Deterrence of International Terrorism: An Evaluation 
of Operation El Dorado Canyon”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1996), pp. 267-280.  
32
 Barros, Carlos Pestana: “An Intervention Analysis of Terrorism: The Spanish ETA Case”, Defence and Peace 
Economics, Vol. 14, No. 6 (2003), pp. 401-412.  
33
 Zussman, Asaf and Zussman, Noam: “Targeted Killings: Evaluating the Effectiveness of a Counter-Terrorism 
Policy”, Discussion Paper, No. 2005.02 (2005), Jerusalem, Bank of Israel Research Department.  
34
 Zycher, Benjamin (2003): A Preliminary Benefit/Cost Framework for Counter-terrorism Public Expenditures, 
Santa Monica, RAND.  
35
 Enders, Walter and Sandler, Todd: “The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression-
Intervention Analysis”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 4 (1993), pp. 829-844.    
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commodities, produced from terrorist and nonterrorist activities”.36 One type of terrorist 
action can be substituted with an alternative kind of attack if it creates the same basic 
commodities. To turn out these basic commodities, terrorists have to select between terrorist 
and non-terrorist actions, while having to deal with only limited resources. If they choose to 
follow the violent terrorist route they have to decide what kind of attack they want to 
perpetrate. Enders and Sandler point out that each type of attack has a ‘price’ that depends on 
how much time is involved to plan and execute the attack, the resources needed and the 
likelihood of the attack being successful.37 This again all depends on what the target is, the 
level of violence sought and where the attack will take place and what security measures are 
in place there. So the 9/11 attacks had a higher per-unit price than the bombing of the USS 
Cole because more resources were needed, the location was better protected and the target 
was more significant. The price of a certain terrorist attack results mostly from the resources 
governments have implemented to stop such an attack. Therefore, Enders and Sandler 
highlight that if one wants to assess the effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies, it is 
important to take into account the possible substitution of attack types due to this ‘price’ 
rise.38   
 
2. Difficulties of the rationalist approach 
The overarching problem of the rationalist approach is that it predominantly focuses on hard 
quantitative data such as measuring the body count or number of incidents and thereby 
ignores many of the qualitative aspects. Success is generally expressed with the help of 
indicators which are easily accessible and quantifiable. Government officials point to the 
decline of the number of terrorist incidents as sign of a successful counter-terrorism 
campaign.  This was the case in press conferences for the publication of the US State 
Department’s annual report Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003.39 It was announced that the 
number of terrorist attacks had fallen and that this was a clear indicator that the United States 
was winning the ‘war on terrorism’. Regardless that this proved to be wrong due to a 
statistical error in their calculations and that the number of attacks actually was higher than 
the previous year, thereby according to their logic indicating the failure of their policies, the 
number of terrorist incidents say nothing about the effectiveness of existing counter-terrorism 
measures. There are many different reasons for why the numbers of incidents can decrease. 
For example, terrorists may be saving up their resources for a devastating attack, trying to 
give governments a false sense of security and aiming to encourage complacency, reduce their 
vigilance and thereby increasing the government’s vulnerability. They may also be in a phase 
of recruiting and training new members or buying new weapons to strike another day. At the 
same time a terrorist group which is actually in decline may opt to attack more frequently and 
more violently in order to prove to governments, supporters and the general public that they 
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 Sandler, Todd and Enders, Walter: “An Economic Perspective on Transnational Terrorism”, European 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2004), pp. 311. 
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 Ibid, pp. 311-313.  
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 Sandler, Todd and Enders, Walter: “Transnational Terrorism: An Economic Analysis”, in Richardson, H.W.; 
Gordon, P. and Moore II, J.E. (eds.) (2005), The Economic Impact of Terrorist Attacks, Northampton, Edward 
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remain a force to be reckoned with, despite these attacks really representing the last twitches 
of a dying organisation.40             
Similarly, when considering for example the terrorist ‘body count’ as an indicator of an 
effective counter-terrorism measure, one has to keep in mind that the overall size of a terrorist 
group is often unknown and many of those captured or killed are low-level recruits who can 
be replaced easily. Even, when one is able to eliminate two-thirds of the top leadership, the 
rank and file of the group may grow, and as a result decentralise and become more resilient. 
Indeed, a terrorist group that loses members to arrest or targeted killings may actually increase 
in overall size if the crackdown generates a backlash. For example, the Provisional IRA 
capitalised on indiscriminate British crackdown to gain recruits.41 Raphael Perl points out that 
“[i]n a western, science-and-technology-oriented society, many feel that if a problem can be 
quantified, it can be solved”.42 However, measuring terrorism with numbers or statistics is to 
a certain extent contradictory. Statistics are supposed to give an insight into general trends and 
patterns.  However, the rare, random-like and uneven nature of terrorism and the fluctuation 
of incidents run counter to the idea of trends and patterns, something that might have been 
realised by the US government when it renamed its annual publication Patterns of Global 
Terrorism to Country Reports on Terrorism. Although governments often proclaim the 
effectiveness of their policies in the absence of further attacks and it may seem logical 
consider a decrease in terrorist activity as an indicator of effective counter-terrorism, the 
asymmetric non-linear nature of terrorism, which aims to surprise it victims, can mean that 
terrorists are biding their time and preparing for a bigger more devastating attack. If a large 
attack happens in one country, as was the case with 9/11, the Madrid and London bombings, 
“although there have been none of that magnitude in preceding or later years, a time series 
based on the number of incidents is of little value.”43  
The determination of the West to measure success in a quantitative numerical form is 
undermined by the difficulty of gathering reliable statistics and figures on terrorism. Apart 
from the traditional problems concerning the field of terrorism research such as the often 
classified nature of the subject, there are a number of issues directly concerned with data 
collection.44 For example, the organisations and governments collecting the data have 
different definitions of what constitutes terrorism, making consistent counting impossible. 
Government figures are biased as they count incidents using a definition of terrorism which 
reflect their political ideals and policy concerns, while non-governmental organisations 
generally have to use media reports to compile their databases, therefore only including 
incidents which make it into the mainstream news. For this reason most domestic terrorism in 
countries such as Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Algeria or Colombia are ignored or reported very 
unevenly, and at the same time it is difficult to judge whether an attack can be attributed to 
terrorism or whether it is part of a continuing civil war.45 Most databases are incomplete with 
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University of Zurich, Working Paper, No. 171 (2003), p. 4. 
44
 For more information on the problems and weaknesses of terrorism research see Silke, Andrew (ed.) (2004): 
Research on Terrorism – Trends, Achievements & Failures, London, Frank Cass; Schmid, Alex P. and Jongman, 
Albert J. (1988): Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and 
Literature, Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Company.  
45
 See Crenshaw, Martha: “Current Research on Terrorism: The Academic Perspective”, Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1992), p. 4.  
UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 12   (Octubre / October 2006) ISSN 1696-2206 
 187 
gaps and cover different time periods, and some even change their criteria for counting 
terrorist incidents halfway through.46 For example, the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base 
covers international terrorism incidents from 1968 to 1997 and from 1998 it claims to include 
international and domestic incidents.47   
This, together with the rareness of terrorism incidents, makes the use of risk management 
or cost benefit calculations awkward. Where as the incidents of other social phenomenon such 
as crime are very frequent, incidents of terrorism, especially large attacks, are very rare in 
comparison. Richard Falkenrath believes that data on terrorism is not really appropriate for 
quantitative analysis, on which risk assessments predominantly relies.48 Apart from the 
limited poor quality data on terrorism, one of the main problems is that the ‘probability’ 
variable in the risk calculation is extremely difficult to measure. Terrorism is not a random 
phenomenon. Unlike other traditional subjects dealt with in risk management such as natural 
disasters, accidents or public health, terrorism is less prone to conforming to statistical 
patterns. Terrorism is caused by humans and they decide when and how to attack. This 
decision is not made randomly but is made after careful consideration and depend on, and is 
influenced by, external factors such as government decisions and actions. Terrorists attack 
deliberately in a form which does not conform to a pattern in order to surprise the opponent. 
As Falkenrath points out “[m]ost estimates of the probability of an event are based on some 
understanding of their past frequency. Simple applications of this frequency theory of 
probability can fail spectacularly when the possible event has occurred only rarely or never at 
all.”49 
Even if probability and risk could be calculated, the cost benefit calculation of reducing 
the risk of terrorism faces grave difficulties. Although one can calculate the direct cost of 
certain anti-terrorist policies such as new x-ray machines or explosive detectors at airports, 
there are a number of hidden costs such as the value of the lost time of travelers. 50 Roger 
Congleton has calculated that if each airplane passenger in the U.S. spends half an hour longer 
at the airport due to increased security measures, the hidden cost of these measures would be 
around $15 billion per year.51 On the benefit side, calculations are even more difficult and 
more issues have to be taken into consideration. As Enders and Sandler point out, one way to 
estimate a portion of this benefit would be to calculate the reduced loss of life attributable to 
airport security measures – i..e. fewer people killed in skyjackings and bombings. If the net 
number of such lives saved, after adjusting for substitution into other life-threatening terrorist 
actions, can be measured, then the average value of a statistical life, although morally highly 
questionable, could be applied to translate these lives into monetary value. One would have to 
also add the reduced financial losses in the form of destroyed planes and buildings as well as 
other even further removed consideration, such as the recession in the airline industry and 
increased insurance premiums to name but a few.52  All of these financial values face great 
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measurement difficulties as “it is difficult to confirm the absence of an occurrence and assign 
causality to that absence.”53 We can only really guess the number of terrorist attacks that are 
prevented by counter-terrorist measures. Some have argued that in order to tackle a question 
one would have to set up two worlds, one in which nothing is done to combat terrorism and 
one where measures against it have been implemented. Furthermore, in order to find out 
exactly which measures are effective, one would have to create a large number of different 
worlds where only one counter measure as well as a large number of combinations of 
measures would be tested.54 
Regardless of whether there are too many variables in play to calculate the effectiveness 
of counter-terrorism measures, the rationalist approaches are missing a vital point. Terrorism, 
as the name implies, is not so much about death and destruction, rather the primary aim is to 
spread terror and fear. The following section will explore the need of including some kind of 
assessment of the perception and feeling of fear in the general population in order to asses 
whether or not counter-terrorism policies are “effective”.  
 
3. The neglected fear factor 
Despite all the attention terrorism is not one of the top killers in the world. Only a few 
hundred people are generally killed each year by international terrorism. John Mueller points 
out that more people in the West are killed by lightning, accidents caused by deer, allergic 
reactions to peanuts or drowned in the bath and toilet than are killed by terrorism.55 And it is 
clear that compared to fatalities due to war, heart and lung disease, cancer or simple traffic 
accidents, the number of direct terrorist victims seems minuscule.56 The U.S. alone suffers 
around 40 000 fatalities each year through traffic accidents and worldwide there are around 
1,2 million people killed in traffic each year.57 9/11 killed around the same number of people 
that die in traffic accidents around the world every day. There are clearly many other more 
acute things people should “rationally” worry about than terrorism. This is highlighted by 
Benjamin Friedman, who argues that “[t]elling Kansan truck drivers to prepare for nuclear 
terrorism is like telling bullfighters to watch out for lighting. It should not be their primary 
safety concern.”58 
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Table 1: Fatalities in International Terrorist Incidences59 
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Table 2: The 10 leading causes of death in the U.S. in 200160  
  
Causes of Death Deaths % of total deaths 
All Causes 2,416,425 100.0 
1. Diseases of heart 700,142 29.0 
2. Malignant neoplasms  553,768 22.9 
3. Cerebrovascular diseases 163,538 6.8 
4. Chronic lower respiratory diseases  123,013 5.1 
5. Accidents  101,537 4.2 
6. Diabetes mellitus 71,372 3.0 
7. Influenza and pneumonia  62,034 2.6 
8. Alzheimer's disease 53,852 2.2 
9. Nephritis, nephrotic syndrom and nephrosis 39,480 1.6 
10. Septicemia 32,238 1.3 
   
Terrorism Aprox. 3000 0.12 
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For terrorism violence is only the means to the end of spreading the psychological effect 
of fear. Fear is the main component of terrorism. The risk of directly being the victim of a 
terrorist attack is tiny; coconuts falling from trees kill more people each year.61 The 
perception of threat, or risk, and any resultant fear from such perceptions, bears no relation to 
the actual risk as “[t]he general public and the political leadership tend to perceive the threat 
of terrorism as a greater problem than the available data would indicate.”62 This perceived 
threat and fear of terrorism is reflected in the reduced number of people flying following 9/11. 
To illustrate this perception of risk more graphically, Michael Sivak and Michael Flannangan 
have calculated the probability of being killed in a domestic US non-stop flight in a major US 
airline, in a 10-year period, as about eight in one hundred million. At the same time, the 
probability of being killed while driving on a rural interstate highway in 2000 was about 4 in 
a billion per kilometre. From this they conclude that driving the distance of an average US 
domestic flight is 65 times more risky than flying, and for flying to become as risky as 
driving, airplane disasters on the scale of 9/11 would have to happen once a month.63  
Why do people fear terrorism more than other more likely causes of death and other 
risks? Why are they not so worried about traffic accidents, diseases or natural disasters such 
as tsunamis that kill millions every year? For scholars in the field of risk perception these 
questions are nothing new and constitutes natural human behaviour. It is widely accepted in 
risk perception that there is a sometimes very wide disparity between the perception of the 
public of risk and the risk indicated by the statistics compiled by experts. The reaction to 
dangers does not seem to match the numerical odds. The literature on misperception in risk 
assessment is substantial and a number of different explanations for this “false sense of 
insecurity”64 have been identified.   
Some point to the fact that people are more afraid of things they cannot control compared 
to things they can such as flying and smoking.65 Others add that people fear the risk of being 
harmed by unfamiliar or exotic things such as nuclear material or sharks more than everyday 
hazards as falling down the stairs.66 Again different scholars highlight that people are more 
fearful and focus more on extreme and dramatic events that kill many people in one go.67  
Related to this, authors such as George Loewenstein, et al., argue that people are more 
fearful the easier they can visualise or imagine a certain event. If the image of the event can 
be accessed easily people will be more fearful of it.68 Things such as terrorism bring to mind 
dramatic images of disaster, such as planes flying into the Twin Towers, which prevents 
people from weighing up the small probabilities of such events. Extreme event such as 
terrorist attacks, plane crashes or jackpot lottery wins are generally reported more intensely 
and remembered more easily than other media reports on risks such as cancer. With pictures 
of these rare events more easily available to people, the probability is generally overestimated. 
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Similarly, when the media report specifically on one normal person’s life who was in the 
wrong place at the wrong time, people generally connect with that person, be it through the 
tearful appeal for help from relatives or the dramatic last words crackling over the mobile 
phone line from the inside of a hijacked plane. The personal insight into the fate of average 
people makes the audience imagine themselves or a family member being in that plane which 
crashed or in that building that collapsed. People fear such events disproportionately 
regardless of the statistical insignificant risk.69 
Some argue that the disproportionate fear of terrorism can be put down to the deliberate 
nature of the violence. Daniel Byman points out that, on a personal level, it causes more grief 
and emotional turmoil when a family member is murdered then when he or she is killed in a 
traffic accident, even though it does not change the fact of death and loss. This is reflected by 
our generally universal societal rules which consider deliberate killing to be worse and 
deserving of harsher punishment than killing someone by accident.70 Taking many of these 
points into consideration Cass Sunstein argues that strong emotions produce a larger 
behavioural response than do statistically identical risks. He points to what he calls a 
“probability neglect” which results from strong emotions, and this makes people focus on the 
badness of the outcome and makes them disregard the probability of the event ever occurring.  
It is possible to recognise a hazard, evaluate the risk, and decide if and what necessary steps to 
take to minimize the risk. However if one is confronted with a risk that evokes a strong 
emotional reaction in the form of fear, we typically misperceive the risk or act as if we 
misperceive the risk.71 
 
4. Thinking about alternatives and supplements 
Even though some may consider it to be dangerous to simply lull “the public into a false sense 
of complacency” and lead  “them to feel that they are secure through seemingly harmless 
placebo policies”72, the effect of fear has to be an important part in assessing the effectiveness 
of counter-terrorist measures. “A special difficulty here consists in the problem of quantifying 
and monetizing fear and its consequences, a problem that has yet to be seriously engaged in 
the relevant literature.”73 So far fear has not been an issue in measuring the effectiveness of 
counter-terrorism measures but one has to realise that not only those killed are victims of 
terrorism, but those who fear it as well.74 Fear in a society is a real cost as people stop flying, 
avoid large gatherings, and spend time and money to reduce their anxiety. As terrorism 
involves the exploitation of fear, which is not always a “rational” feeling, can rationalist 
approaches adequately measure the effectiveness of counter-terrorist policies? If fear is one of 
the main components of terrorism, should not the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures 
also be assessed by the level of fear they reduce? Should the focus be to shift away at least 
partly from the expert to the layperson, to those who are the victims of terrorism and 
experience its effects directly as the emotional state of terror or fear?  
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The obvious problem one faces is how to ‘measure’ or gauge fear. Considering that the 
rationalist economic measurements have difficulties, sociological and psychological empirical 
measurements will seem even less exact. Estimating the feeling of fear in a society and of 
individuals due to terrorism seems impossible.  Nevertheless, a number of indicators, which 
are supposed to highlight the general feeling of fear in a society, have been suggested. For 
example one could examine consumer confidence as an indicator of the public mood or the 
level of domestic and international support for the government and its policies as an indicator 
of the level of fear. However, the problem is that these indicators are affected by a vast range 
of other factors not related to security from terrorism, such as the state of the economy with 
the employment rate and inflation as well as general dissatisfaction with the government’s 
performance in other areas.75 A different potential way of assessing the general feeling of 
safety would be to examine the changing patterns of tourist travel. Do people in Germany still 
go on holiday to Indonesia, Spain or London, or has there been a change in their holiday-
destination choice due to terrorism? There is general consensus that 9/11 had a devastating 
effect on tourism, nevertheless, it is difficult to prove that a change in the long-term tourism 
patterns across the world are predominantly due to terrorism. There are many other potential 
variables which could contribute to a change of tourism patterns.    
As a result, one seems forced to return to empirical evidence such as public opinion polls 
to give us a sense of how people feel about the counter-terrorism policies implemented by 
their governments. There are number of opinion polls one could consult on the general issue 
of fear of terrorism. In an opinion poll conducted in the U.S. in 1998/99 84 percent of the 
general public considered international terrorism to be the most ‘critical threat’ to their 
country above all others and 61 percent of the questioned ‘leaders’ viewed it the same way.76  
In Europe the European Commission conducted four Eurobarometer public opinion polls 
between autumn 2001 and spring 2003, and asked 1000 people in fifteen member states about 
their fears. The results indicated that the fear of terrorism fluctuated between 86 and 78 per 
cent.77  There have been a number of other attempts to capture the feeling of the population in 
questionnaires, interviews and opinion polls. Reports of the Allensbacher Institute of Public 
Opinion Polls have shown that the fear of terrorist attack in Germany has dropped from 56 per 
cent in December 2001-January 2002 to 45 per cent in December 2003 and 29 per cent in 
January 2004. However, following the attacks in Madrid this feeling of fear rose again sharply 
to 57 per cent in April 2004, a higher rate than following the 9/11 attacks.78 In stark contrast, 
an opinion poll by Populus in the UK shortly after the July 7th terrorist attacks in London 
pointed out the 78 per cent of the people questioned will not change their normal routine, 
travel, holiday or trips to central London as a result of the terrorist attacks, indicating that the 
fear of terrorism appears to be substantially lower than in Germany.79  
Although these differences are interesting considering that the UK is a more likely target, 
these opinion polls face a number of problems. Apart from the classical problems associated 
with opinion polls and interviews, there is another major flaw: how far can a questionnaire 
really capture the feeling of fear? A paper-based response by ticking boxes or giving the 
feeling of fear a number on a scale of one to ten seems to miss a vital point. Even when 
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interviews are used they are simply analysed according to what was roughly said. Questions 
are formulated along the line of: Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid 
of. For each of these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not? Or: Are you 
afraid that it will come to a terrorist attack in Germany in the near future or not? The answers 
are then placed in categories and made into tables and graphs to show the increase or decrease 
of fear in the population.  
If fear is the main component of terrorism and sits so uneasily with rationalist 
approaches, it may be fruitful to consider an alternative methodological approach to 
‘measuring’ the effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies: constructivism. Although not 
explicitly framed in such terminology, constructivism has played an important role in 
terrorism research in the past, as it has helped in the understanding of the controversy and 
difficulty of defining terrorism. The phrase ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom 
fighter’ was then often used to highlight “the socially constructed nature of agents or 
subjects”.80 Constructivism reminds us that the concept of terrorism is constructed through 
language and within particular political contexts. There is no concrete phenomenon called 
terrorism in the world that exists independent of our subjective understandings and our 
culture.  
As we have seen, the risk of terrorism for the average layperson is minimal and the fear 
produced stands in no “rational” proportion to the risk. If fear cannot be comprehended 
rationally and is in fact socially constructed then a social constructivist methodology seems 
appropriate to complement or substitute the rational risk-management and cost-benefit 
approaches. As Alexander Wendt points out “[s]ocial threats are constructed, not natural”.81  
The feeling of fear originates from the idea that terrorism is a threat. This feeling in turn 
influences our behaviour and the behaviour of the state. They introduce counter-terrorism 
measures which in turn reinforce our idea that terrorism is a threat. And so the circle 
continues. If the threat of terrorism is socially constructed, the measures aimed at dealing with 
it also have to be socially constructed through language. Therefore, could the effectiveness of 
these measures be assessed by examining the discourse that constructs the threat and the 
response?    
It is widely accepted that discourse analysis has to be based on text, written or oral, by 
authorized speakers and writers and that speech acts only enter the discourse if they are 
articulated by important people. In other word, the researcher should focus on experts.82  In 
line with this, one could analyse the discourse on counter-terrorism held by authorized 
speakers such as government officials, politicians or counter-terrorism experts and examine 
which counter-measures are talked to be effective. However, this would not give us an insight 
into whether these measures are good at reducing the fear of the general public. Jennifer 
Milliken points out that the main weakness of the dominant approach of focusing on the 
expert discourse lies in the fact that it leaves out what happens once policies are 
implemented.83 It is not clear to what extent the measures considered effective in the expert 
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discourse really transcend to the discourse of the layperson. And it is the layperson who is 
predominantly the target of terrorism today, not the expert. The emphasis should be on the 
layperson as an alternative to the prevailing and dominant focus on experts in policy decisions 
and the continuing trend of expertisation. Is not the dominant focus of much of the existing 
discourse analysis on official texts by politicians and experts with authority a contradiction to 
the central constructivist argument of questioning established knowledge? A central 
characteristic of terrorism today, so we are told, is that it targets the layperson. If the 
layperson is the target of terrorism, are the opinions and feelings found in the ‘layperson 
discourse’ not essential in the evaluation of the effectiveness of counter-terrorism?   
The obvious problem arising from this is how to access this layperson discourse. Milliken 
suggests here to “use first hand media reports, Internet network sources, and even fieldwork 
and interviews”.84 One could combine parts of the opinion poll and interview method 
mentioned above with a more social constructivist methodology such as discourse analysis. 
The answers given in interviews and opinion polls such as the ones mentioned above are 
without doubt of importance; however, how something is said and what is conveyed through 
the use of specific language and rhetoric also needs to be considered. Closed questions about 
the feeling of fear can therefore only offer limited insight and a more open-ended 
conversation might be more revealing of the underlying feelings. Interviews of the general 
public, giving them the opportunity to talk freely on the topic of terrorism and the policies to 
combat it, could provide a useful insight into the layperson discourse and the social constructs 
embedded in it. Researchers could also focus on TV talk show audiences, public meetings, 
Internet chat rooms and blogs or local community newspapers written by laypersons. 
Alternatively, one could focus on the transitional level between expert and layperson. Here 
expert knowledge is (re-)constructed by the mass media before it is (re-)constructed again and 
consumed and incorporated into the layperson discourse.85 Here, due to their large circulation, 
availability and the consistency they provide, popular tabloid newspapers read by the average 
person in the street such as the Sun in the UK or the Bild in Germany might prove very 
suitable. Others may question how far the discourse found in tabloid newspapers really 
represents the discourse of the average layperson. Antonio Gramsci for example would refer 
to the media as well as other institutions of civil society which regulate populations such as 
churches, schools and universities, as the extended state.86 Do newspapers not often have a 
certain agenda according to their political orientation and is their discourse not shaped by the 
elite owners of the corresponding media group?  How far is this discourse really taken up by 
the population?    
Whatever source one eventually decides on examining, the researcher is still left with the 
problem of how to conduct a discourse analyse of the layperson or layperson-near discourse. 
The literature on discourse analysis in IR has increased over the last couple of years and there 
a number of studies which aim to examine the socially constructed nature of the world 
through the use of such methodology.87 Although a how-to guide of constructivist discourse 
analysis is opposed by more post-modern elements who consider it a way of silencing 
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alternative perspectives and interpretations of knowledge, Jennifer Milliken,88 as well as 
Roxanne Doty,89 suggest a method which may be fruitful in the effort to assess the 
effectiveness of counter-terrorism. They provide a short insight into ‘predicate analysis’, 
which has the potential to be used in what this paper calls for: the evaluation of counter-
terrorism policy focusing on their ability to reduce fear in the general public. Using predicate 
analysis to examine newspaper articles in tabloids related to terrorism and counter-measures 
and focusing on predication — i.e., the verbs, adverbs and adjectives that construct nouns as a 
particular kind of thing, with particular characteristics and capacities — one could gain useful 
information on what policies are talked to be effective and constructed as reducing fear. One 
could examine the identity construction of the other, i.e., the “terrorist” as the source of 
insecurity, looking not only at the construction of insecurity by his actions but also the 
insecurity constructed by “the very visibility of its mode of being as other”.90  Apart from this, 
focusing on the “terrorist other”, one could also centre on the nouns representing certain 
counter-terrorism policies and the predication of these measures by the verbs, adverbs and 
adjectives surrounding them as a means that can give us a glimpse into their capacities of 
giving people the feeling of safety. So the language used in the predications of things, such as 
‘armed soldiers’ at airports, construct them in a certain way, giving them certain 
characteristics and therefore gives us an idea of their effectiveness through their ability to 
reduce fear. 
It is clear that more research is needed to establish in more detail what alternatives or 
supplements there are to the existing rationalist approaches and whether the proposed 
constructivist discourse analysis of the layperson (near) discourse is a fruitful option. What 
ever other possibilities one may consider suitable for accessing the appropriate discourse 
level, one thing this paper hopes to have conveyed it that the rationalist methods alone do not 
suffice.  
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to highlight the weaknesses of the dominant rationalist ways of 
assessing the effectiveness of counter-terrorism and with this prepare the stage for alternatives 
or supplements to be considered. The traditional rationalist approaches to measuring the 
effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures such as risk management or cost-benefit 
calculations do not provide a full satisfactory answer and face a number of difficulties. Data 
used is very unreliable and there are too many intervening variables that can influence their 
calculations. Examining quantitative data on terrorism such as the number of incidents or 
killed terrorists to establish patterns of behaviour and ascribe effectiveness to certain counter-
measures does not really fit the fluctuating, random-like nature of terrorism, who’s aim it is to 
surprise and catch people of guard.  
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Most important, however, is that they neglect the central characteristic of terrorism: the 
spread of terror and fear. Although the fear of terrorism may be disproportionate to the risk, it 
is vital to take it into consideration when discussing the effectiveness of counter-terrorism 
measures. One may even want to go as far as claiming that the feeling of fear is an indicator 
of whether counter-terrorism measures are effective, regardless of whether they truly 
contribute to the quantitative reduction of terrorism. If counter-measures reduce the fear of 
terrorism among the general population then they are effective. Therefore, the feeling of fear 
is an important publicly available mean of evaluating the effects of existing counter-terrorism 
policies. Whether the proposed constructivist methodology of discourse analysis, or more 
precisely predicate analysis, can provide a useful addition to the dominant rationalist 
approaches need to be examined in more detail. However, the focus on the layperson’s fear of 
terrorism is essential as an alternative to the prevailing role of experts in the creation of 
government policies.   
Ultimately one should also consider not only questioning the rationalist approaches and 
suggesting constructivist style alternatives but also deconstructing the apparent Western 
practice of measuring and counting everything. Why does the West have to measure things? 
Measuring implies counting and numbers, which lead us to believe that increases and 
decreases are possible. If we can count things and measure them then we feel they exist and 
are able to comprehend them. Generally the westerns scientific influence makes us believe 
that if a problem can be quantified, it can be measured, and therefore it is possible for it to be 
solved. The debate over the winning or losing of the ‘war on terrorism’ lends itself to the 
further examination of not only the moderate constructivist application of discourse analysis 
and the ‘measurement’ of counter-terrorist effectiveness, but also provides us with a 
possibility of deconstructing the dominant scientific philosophy of measuring.    
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